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Abstract
The study evaluates the effect of both the publication of Inflation Report (IR)’s fore-
casts and the subsequent media diffusion efforts (made by 5 central banks) on (i) the
dispersion of ‘fixed-event’ forecasts for inflation (pi) and real growth (g) produced
by the macroeconomic insiders of a country (and gathered by Consensus Economics
Inc.), as well as (ii) the distance between their median and the aforementioned offi-
cial forecasts. The 5 central banks correspond to the monetary authorities in Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and United Kingdom. Statistically testing the effects on
the dispersion and distance uses a common sample of monthly forecasts from 2004
to 2014 and reach high specificity by using separate samples according to the fore-
casting horizon (short and medium ‘term’) and the macroeconomic uncertainty level
(IR publication months are classified as either high- or low-uncertainty months).
With a significance level of 10%, the general results are that (i) increases and
decreases in the dispersion can be attributed to either IR forecast publication or
media diffusion; and (ii) increases and decreases in the distance can be attributed to
either IR forecast publication or media diffusion, although the number of increases
in the distance is low relative to (i).
On the whole, the number of decreases in the dispersion and distance is low
for 4 of 5 inflation-targeting central banks considered, which suggests the expecta-
tion management is still an elusive goal (Colombia is relatively close to achieve it,
though). The scarce positive findings reflect the monetary authorities maintain an
insufficient degree of credibility and thus they confront a context of monetary pol-
icy and expectations management that has been denominated exogenous influence
in Hubert (2011)’s heterogeneous-agent model. Under such a framework, the mon-
etary authorities (1) should respond to shocks by using an optimal rule depending
upon the private forecasts (instead of their own internal forecasts); and (2) would
not be able to drive the private expectations towards the fundamental values of the
macroeconomic variables, for their influence would only come from their qualita-
tive policy signals. The increases in dispersion and distance reflect the poor results
central banks are obtaining by ‘leaning against the wind’ with respect to the IR
forecasts publication and the subsequent media diffusion efforts, that is, by rejecting
(1) and (2) and acting ‘as if’ their policy context was the most favorable one.
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I. Introduction
Under normal conditions, as the institutional arrangement in a particular country lim-
its the agents’ capabilities to acquire and process relevant information for their decisions,
their expectation formation is slow. The majority of economic agents delegate information
processing and acquisition tasks to macroeconomic insiders.1 From all those insiders,2 the
central bank stands out for its macroeconomic policy actions affect the dynamics of many
variables relevant to the decisions of the majority of economic agents. It is natural that
the other macroeconomic insiders pay attention to monetary authority’s actions, espe-
cially when it discloses the future macroeconomic outlook to justify them. By the same
token, corporations usually delegate information acquisition and processing tasks to the
insiders while their price setting power is greater than the households’.
This is nearly the monetary policy framework for inflation targeting (IT), an institu-
tional arrangement adopted by a growing number of countries. Under this framework,
the central bank is accountable for any deviation the observed inflation may have with
respect to a previously announced target range (or target value). In addition to taking
monetary policy actions to reach the explicit target, a central bank under IT must disclose
the future medium-term outlook which is consistent with those actions (by publishing its
Inflation Report (IR) on a regular basis). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that, if
an IT central bank achieves the buildup of an intangible stock of specific credibility from
a history of milestones,3 at least the insiders will consider the central bank’s announced
forecasts4 as quantitative or qualitative signals inside their own expectation formation
process about the future (these signals condition the economic decision problems of the
insiders and the corporations hiring them). If not, it will confront its monetary policy
scenario with relatively low credibility.
The paper aims to statistically test under which specific circumstances there exists
a signal effect on the insiders’ forecasts whenever the central banks of Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Peru and United Kingdom disclose their corresponding announced forecasts:
¿does a signal effect exist when such a disclosure takes place under low macroeconomic
uncertainty (before the consequences of low-magnitude shocks)? or instead ¿does a signal
effect exist when such a disclosure takes place under high macroeconomic uncertainty
(before the consequences of high-magnitude shocks like those generated in the aftermath
of the recent international crisis)? By considering a sample of monthly data (2004-2014),
the high specificity of these questions can be achieved. After more than a decade of these
countries’ adoption of the inflation targeting framework, the search for answers to these
questions has come at an opportune time if at least the ‘type’ of each central bank as a
one-digit inflation stabilizer has passed the test of time.
While considering statistical tests conditional on the degree of macroeconomic un-
certainty, a high macroeconomic uncertainty does encompass exceptional events such as
international financial crises, structural changes and climate shocks. All these events
1This environment is supported by U.S. data (Coibion & Gorodnichenko, 2010; Fuhrer, 2011), in
contrast to the stories told by models assuming the rational expectations hypothesis.
2The set of professional forecasters and financial market participants.
3Credibility is specific to the value of information the agents ignored until the period τ ≤ t. Referring
to the specific goal the central bank is considering, the credibility built when the central bank’s goal is
the inflation reduction to a one-digit inflation level is clearly different from the one built when its goal is
to stabilize inflation around the price-stability level (an annual rate between 1 and 3%), which is different
from the one built when the latter goal is coupled with the goal of financial stability. Referring to how
and why the monetary authority takes specific policy actions, the credibility built when the central bank
only discloses the set of forecast scenarios to justify those actions is qualitatively different from the one
built when the model or the scenario-generating system is also disclosed.
4Since these forecasts are disclosed to the public as the central bank’s context for its future monetary
policy actions, they are not independent from the Board members’ informed opinions. See Robertson
(2000), Blinder et al. (2008), Edge & Gurkaynak (2011), Kang et al. (2013), and Nunes (2013).
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increase the macroeconomic uncertainty, induce herd behavior and liberate consumers’
and investors’ animal spirits. Upon the uncertainty jump, diverse economic agents’ per-
ceptions about future macroeconomic outlook greatly deteriorate, thus expectations turn
out adverse with respect to maintaining the levels of inflation (pi) and real growth (g)
observed in the temporal vicinity of the corresponding forecasts’ announcement.5 If and
only if the monetary authorities’ announced forecasts (used to justify monetary policy
actions) have successfully been perceived as credible,6 they will be able to stabilize the
other insiders’ perceptions about the economy’s future outlook. A secondary hypothesis
is that this expectations stabilization ability is stronger in periods of high macroeconomic
uncertainty than in periods of low macroeconomic uncertainty (economic agents become
highly attentive under high uncertainty).
To achieve the study’s goals, the insiders’ forecasts and the corresponding central bank’
announced forecasts are jointly considered. For each country, the insiders’ forecasts are
gathered by Consensus Economics Inc. as a forecast survey whose results are published
monthly. On the other hand, the IT central banks’ announced forecasts are included
inside their regularly published inflation reports (IRs). Next section presents an stylized
discussion of the main conceptual issues behind the study’s hypothesis. The ensuing
sections describe the data, the hypothesis being tested with them, as well as the results.
The last section concludes with some policy recommendations.
II. Conceptual framework
Filacek & Saxa (2012) defend the idea that the central bank’s macroeconomic outlook
will be adequately transmitted or communicated to the majority of economic agents if
the insiders’ expectations are in line with the central bank’s announced expectations.
These authors conducted statistical tests to ascertain whether the insiders’ expectations
are in line with the central bank’s announced forecasts by focusing on the changes in
both the dispersion of the insiders’ informed opinions or forecasts (see next section) and
the distance between these informed opinions’ median and the central bank’s announced
forecasts.
However, what is really being tested is whether the insiders use the central bank’s
announced forecasts to form their own expectations; and for this to happen, the insiders
must value the announced forecasts as information.7 This re-interpretation is perfectly
consistent with Hubert (2011): if the insiders’ expectations are adjusted towards the
central bank’s because they have proved to be superior as quantitative policy signals,
then the central bank will confront a context of private expectations management known
as endogenous influence. It is only inside this context that the monetary authority can
drive private expectations towards ’the fundamental value of the variables’, and thus the
disclosure of the monetary authority’s announced forecasts should generate a significantly
negative impact effect on the aforementioned dispersion and distance. In fact, such a
decrease is constrained to the two-month period immediately after the publication month
of any IR forecast (in line with Filacek & Saxa, 2012).
5This is also reflected in the forecasting performance decline of the majority of multi-equation models
built for the sake of forecasting key macroeconomic variables. See Stock & Watson (2010)’s assessment
of the structural models for forecasting U.S. inflation as well as a forecasting evaluation of non-structural
models for the Peruvian case (Barrera, 2013).
6The last section will provide some recommendations for improving their credibility on this regard.
7Huang & Trehan (2008) consider the firms’ expectations about pi are closer to the professional forecast-
ers’ expectations (i.e., the insiders’ expectations about pi) than to the households’ expectations because
firms contract insiders to gauge the future inflation. While firms’ price setting is usually based on this
information, insiders’ expectations about pi are (relative to households’): (i) less sensible to increases
in energy and food prices (see Trehan 2011) and (ii) less temporarily biased in those periods when, for
this reason, relatively high levels of pi are observed. Therefore, insiders’ medium-term pi expectations are
particularly useful for assessing monetary authorities’ credibility (see Trehan & Zorrilla 2012).
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Inside the context of private expectations management known as exogenous influence
(Hubert, 2011), in contrast, the monetary authority must follow a policy rule that de-
pends on the private forecasts instead of its own internal forecasts and thus the monetary
authority’s influence comes only through its qualitative policy signals. In our interpre-
tation, the insiders will drive private expectations towards ’the fundamental value of the
variables’ in the best of cases (only if the monetary authority accepts to operate under
these conditions) while the dispersion and distance would not respond to the monetary
authority’s announced forecasts. However, if the researcher finds out increases in the
dispersion and/or the distance, it will mean that the monetary authority is obtaining
counterproductive results by ‘leaning against the wind’ with respect to the publication
and the media diffusion of its announced forecasts about pi and g. In other terms, the
monetary authority would be reacting with a different policy rule and assuming its influ-
ence comes through its quantitative policy signals (as if its policy context was the
most favorable one).
By getting the best of Filacek & Saxa (2012)’s proposed tests, the study uses 2 mea-
sures of implicit coordination:8 the dispersion of the insiders’ forecasts and the distance
between the median of these forecasts and the monetary authority’s announced forecast
(with respect to either pi or g). This is in spite of Lahiri & Sheng (2009)’s criticism to-
wards the usage of dispersion, which is based on expressing the aggregate uncertainty of
one individual macroeconomic variable’s forecasts as the sum of the forecasts’ dispersion
and the insiders’ perceived ex ante volatility (associated to the future aggregate shocks
affecting the variable). Since all insiders can quantify the same ex post volatility associ-
ated to aggregate shocks affecting the variable in the past, it is argued here that ex post
volatility explains the levels of dispersion and distance, instead. Therefore, next section’s
statistical tests will control for its effect on the dispersion and distance measures.
The study evaluates whether the central banks’ announced forecasts (a) reduce the
measures of coordination (dispersion and distance) on average across all two-month peri-
ods (immediately following the months of IR publication) available in the whole sample
period (i.e., whether announced forecasts ‘anchor private expectations’), and (b) allow
anchoring expectations in periods of low macroeconomic uncertainty (on average across
all two-month periods immediately following those months of IR publication classified as
‘normal times’) as well as in periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty (on average across
all two-month periods immediately following those months of IR publication classified as
‘abnormal times’ -in the aftermath of large shocks). Evaluation (b) can be useful for the
policymaker because learning to manage expectations during calm periods can actually
make it easy to learn to manage expectations during turbulent periods.
III. Data and hypothesis tests
Data
The sample of the insiders’ monthly forecasts for the british, chilean, colombian, mex-
ican and peruvian economies is january 2004 - december 2014, a period encompassing
important portions of the corresponding elapsed times from the adoption of inflation tar-
geting framework to date (1991 for Chile, 2000 for Colombia, 1995 for Mexico, 1994 for
Peru and 1993 for United Kingdom).9 These forecasts are surveyed monthly by Consensus
Economics Inc. and refer to two fixed events, the end of current year and the end of next
year; therefore, the forecast horizons with respect to these fixed events vary from 1 to 24
8The implicit assumption here is that the insiders’ net profits from coordinating their forecasts with
the central bank’s announced forecasts are sufficiently high (i.e., coordination gross profits well above
coordination costs).
9See Table 1 in Schmidt-Hebbel (2009). The formal adoption for Peru took place in 2002, when the
monetary authority opted for managing short-term interest rate as the monetary policy’s instrument.
4
months.10
In general, the central banks published their IRs with forecasts for the same fixed
events, but the key issue considering hypothesis testing, as the reader will see next, is to
correctly match each central bank’s announced forecast to the specific set of Consensus-
surveyed insiders’ forecasts it can directly and immediately influence as a policy signal
(two months of Consensus Forecasts for either pi or g). To tackle this problem, the em-
phasis is placed on the exact dates on which each central bank discloses the announced
forecasts in its IRs (see Annex C). Once the dates of the two corresponding Consensus
Forecasts surveys are determined, the IR announced forecasts for both variables are as-
signed to the corresponding place in row ‘g’ of the aforementioned data matrix, the row
just below the one with ‘standard deviations’.11 Note that at the beginning of the sample,
the series of official forecasts are not continuous because forecasts inside the corresponding
IR are ‘not available’.12
One must also take into account that each individual insider considered in Consensus
Forecasts has a sub-sequence of ‘not available’ forecasts (e.g., inside each row in Annex
A). Therefore, although the usual statistics (the standard deviation for the dispersion and
the median for the calculation of the distance) can always be computed from the set of
forecasts associated to those insiders who did send their forecasts for each variable in each
specific matrix (specific month in the sample 2004-2014), the available forecasts are not
numerous. The number of the insiders effectively surveyed by Consensus Economics Inc.
in some countries becomes less than 10 for some months and does not usually reach the
85% of the total number of insiders surveyed during the whole sample period.13
Besides, the performance of the standard deviation (the dispersion estimator used
by Filacek & Saxa, 2012, and Consensus Forecasts) is known to be poor when data
is generated by a non-symmetric distribution or a heavy-tail distribution. Under these
circumstances, robust dispersion estimators have been proposed by Rousseeuw & Croux
1993 (Sn y Qn), which are defined below for the sake of completeness. Given a sample of
n points, x = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, the Sn- and Qn-dispersion estimators are defined as
Sn ≡ smpsmgmedi{medj{|xi − xj|}}
Qn ≡ qmpqmg{|xi − xj|; i < j}(k), k ≡
(
h
2
)
, h ≡ bn/2c+ 1
where smg and qmg are the adjustment factors compensating for the (asymptotic) large-
sample bias with respect to a normal distribution, and smp and qmp, the adjustment factors
compensating for the small-sample bias. The usage of the former keeps the homogeneity
between the dispersion estimated measure and that one would obtain if the data came
from a Gaussian distribution; the usage of the latter compensates for the potentially small
number of surveyed insiders, which can be less than 10 for some countries (see Croux &
10Consensus Economics Inc. publishes forecasts surveys for Latin America in Latin American Consen-
sus Forecasts, a publication with bi-monthly frequency between March 1993 and April 2001 and monthly
frequency afterwards; for G7 countries such as United Kingdom, the forecasts surveys are availabe in
(G7-) Consensus Forecasts, a publication with monthly frequency since the beginnings of the 90s. As
an illustration, Annex A lists the whole set of insiders surveyed for Peruvian forecasts during 2004-2014;
Annex B lists the Peruvian variables whose forecasts are surveyed. Consensus Forecasts will be used to
refer to both publications interchangeably from here on.
11As an illustration, see the first 2 columns of such a matrix in Annex A for the Peruvian case; the
other columns therein come in pairs (current year and next year), a pair for each variable in Annex B.
12The preferred series of official forecasts do not assume a fixed monetary policy rate during the
forecasting period (i.e., analogous to the insiders’ forecasts.)
13In Annex A the reader can verify Consensus Economics Inc. surveyed a total of 28 insiders for Peru
during the whole sample period. The total number of surveyed insiders reaches 44 for United Kingdom,
the maximum of the 5 countries considered.
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Rousseeuw, 1992). With respect to the notation, {yi}(k) refers to the k-th order statistic
obtained from the data set {yi};
(
a
b
)
, to the combinations of a elements taken in groups
of b elements; and bcc ≡ max{d ∈ Z|d ≤ c}, to the maximum integer of c.
The benefits from using other alternative dispersion estimators (such as the inter-
quartil range, the bi-weight mid-variance or any member of the truncated-median family)
are minimized by the aforementioned scarce number of effectively surveyed forecasts. The
statistical efficiency, that is, an estimator’s convergence velocity towards its population
value, is another criterion for not considering other alternative dispersion estimators (such
as the median of the absolute deviations with respect to the median, MAD).14
Hypothesis tests
Two hypothesis will be contrasted with each country’s data (somewhat similar to
Filacek & Saxa (2012)’s):
• Ha. The insiders consider the central bank’s announced forecasts as policy signals
to form their expectations (forecasts) about their economy (pi or g), so these signals
favor an implicit coordination: the disclosure of monetary authority’s announced
forecasts generates an immediate decrease in the robust measures of dispersion or
distance.
• Hb. The coordination’s effects depend upon the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Assuming fixed the coordination costs with respect to the uncertainty, the greater
the uncertainty, the greater the gross benefit obtained from coordinating, and there-
fore, coordination is reinforced: under a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty,
the disclosure of monetary authority’s announced forecasts generates an immediate
decrease in the robust measures of dispersion or distance.
These hypotheses are contrasted considering forecasts for both the Consumer-Price-
Index (CPI) inflation rate (pi) and the Gross-Domestic-Product (GDP) growth rate (g),
two complementary robust measures of the insiders’ forecasts dispersion, Sn yQn,15 as well
as the distance between the insiders’ forecast median and the central bank’s announced
forecasts (already used in Filacek & Saxa, 2012).
The forecast horizon h allows to make a key distinction between two types of forecasts
(and between the corresponding two types of each coordination measure computed with
them): the short-term forecast set (h ≤ 12, with respect to the ‘end-of-current-year’ fixed
event) and the medium-term forecast set (h > 12, with respect to the ‘end-of-next-year’
fixed event).16
The 3 measures of implicit coordination are plotted in Figures 1-6, depending upon
which specific forecasts are used in their computation (pi’s or g’s), and only for the months
corresponding to the first forecast surveys that can be directly and immediately affected
by the sequence of disclosures of monetary authority’s announced forecasts (as will be
clear next, those surveys are labeled {2}). Then follows a stylized description of Ha and
Hb tests, only for the case of dispersions and the universe set of forecasts corresponding
to the ‘end-of-current-year’ fixed event.
14MAD’s statistical efficiency with respect to the usual estimator is only 37% with samples from the
Gaussian distribution, while the statistical efficiencies corresponding to Sn and Qn are 58% and 88%,
respectively. See Rousseeuw & Croux (1992,1993).
15Since Rousseeuw & Croux (1993) support Sn because it behaves better than Qn with small samples,
it appears we can only emphasize the results associated with Sn. However, results for Sn and Qn will be
considered here because (1) Qn is more statistically efficient than Sn, and (2) Qn’s influence function is
free from discontinuities.
16Filacek & Saxa (2012) do not maintain that, for their ‘joint tests’ (i.e., without discriminating by
the range of h) to be valid, it is required to control for the effect of h on dispersion and distance.
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Figure 1: Measures of implicit coordination of pi forecasts (YoY % change)
(a) Sn Dispersion of short-term forecasts made on {2} month
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(b) Sn Dispersion of medium-term forecasts made on {2} month
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Note: The graphics show the Sn dispersion of the pi forecasts surveyed on the current month ({2}), which can be affected
by the central bank’s announced forecast (IR publication). Although these forecasts have differente forecast horizons, they
can be grouped as either short-term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of current year (panel (a)) or medium-
term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of next year (panel (b)).
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Figure 2: Measures of implicit coordination of pi forecasts (YoY % change)
(a) Qn Dispersion of short-term forecasts made on {2} month
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(b) Qn Dispersion of medium-term forecasts made on {2} month
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Note: The graphics show the Qn dispersion of the pi forecasts surveyed on the current month ({2}), which can be affected
by the central bank’s announced forecast (IR publication). Although these forecasts have differente forecast horizons, they
can be grouped as either short-term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of current year (panel (a)) or medium-
term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of next year (panel (b)).
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Figure 3: Measures of implicit coordination of pi forecasts (YoY % change)
(a) Distance of short-term forecasts made on {2} month
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(b) Distance of medium-term forecasts made on {2} month
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Note: The graphics show the distance between the median of the surveyed pi forecasts and the central bank’s announced
forecast. The former forecasts were surveyed on the current month ({2}) such that they can be affected by the central bank’s
announced forecast (IR publication). Although these forecasts have differente forecast horizons, they can be grouped as
either short-term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of current year (panel (a)) or medium-term-horizon forecasts
when they aim to the end of next year (panel (b)).
9
Figure 4: Measures of implicit coordination of g forecasts (12-mo. avg. % change)
(a) Sn Dispersion of short-term forecasts made on {2} month
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(b) Sn Dispersion of medium-term forecasts made on {2} month
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Note: The graphics show the Sn dispersion of the g forecasts surveyed on the current month ({2}), which can be affected
by the central bank’s announced forecast (IR publication). Although these forecasts have differente forecast horizons, they
can be grouped as either short-term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of current year (panel (a)) or medium-
term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of next year (panel (b)).
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Figure 5: Measures of implicit coordination of g forecasts (12-mo. avg. % change)
(a) Qn Dispersion of short-term forecasts made on {2} month
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(b) Qn Dispersion of medium-term forecasts made on {2} month
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Note: The graphics show the Qn dispersion of the g forecasts surveyed on the current month ({2}), which can be affected
by the central bank’s announced forecast (IR publication). Although these forecasts have differente forecast horizons, they
can be grouped as either short-term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of current year (panel (a)) or medium-
term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of next year (panel (b)).
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Figure 6: Measures of implicit coordination of g forecasts (12-mo. avg. % change)
(a) Distance of short-term forecasts made on {2} month
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(b) Distance of medium-term forecasts made on {2} month
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Note: The graphics show the distance between the median of the surveyed g forecasts and the central bank’s announced
forecast. The former forecasts were surveyed on the current month ({2}) such that they can be affected by the central bank’s
announced forecast (IR publication). Although these forecasts have differente forecast horizons, they can be grouped as
either short-term-horizon forecasts when they aim to the end of current year (panel (a)) or medium-term-horizon forecasts
when they aim to the end of next year (panel (b)).
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For the sake of specificity, the paper distinguishes two kinds of hypotheses. Firstly,
the Ha hypothesis considers the insiders coordinate their forecasts about a particular
variable (say pi) with the corresponding central bank’s announced forecasts in the sense
that the latter’s publication and media diffusion, when this forecast has the function of
a quantitative coordination signal, generates a reduction in the average net dispersion
of the insiders’ forecasts (dispersion net of other sources of variation; see below). To
contrast this hypothesis, the universe set of all monthly cross sections of insiders’ forecast
corresponding to the ‘end-of-current-year’ fixed event must be partitioned into 3 disjoint
sets of cross sections according to their temporal relationship with respect to each IR
announced forecast’s publication month of the corresponding central bank:
1. the forecasts of the month just before the month of the IR publication date (and
evidently before all the media diffusion efforts for the already published announced
forecast);
2. the forecasts of the month after 1., i.e., the month of the first survey that can be
immediately affected by the IR announced forecast’s publication (if this forecast is
considered as a ‘quantitative signal’); and
3. the forecasts of the month after 2., i.e., the month of the second survey that can
be immediately affected by both the IR announced forecast’s publication and the
following media diffusion efforts (if this forecast is considered as a ‘quantitative
signal’).
The robust dispersion (sayQn) is computed for each cross section in these three subsets
of monthly forecast cross sections. The first series of monthly dispersions corresponds to
the ‘controls’; the second series corresponds to the ‘subjects’ treated by the publication;
and the third series corresponds to the ‘subjects’ treated by the publication and the media
diffusion efforts. After computing the average of the monthly dispersions for each series,
it is possible to plot the average gross dispersion’s ‘temporal evolution’ over the ‘average
quarter’ {1, 2, 3}, which provides the raw material for testing the effects of the publication
and the media diffusion of central bank’s announced forecasts.
In effect, it is not valid to implement the tests with this raw material. It is mandatory
to estimate an auxiliary regression with all the three groups of monthly dispersions (the
control groups and the two groups of ‘subjects’) to control for other causal sources of
variation, i.e., different from the publication and the media diffusion of central bank’s
announced forecasts. The final product is the estimated residual vector: the three groups
of monthly net dispersions, i.e., the adjusted group of controls and the adjusted two groups
of ‘subjects’. Lastly, upon obtaining the averages of these groups, the resulting average net
dispersion’s ‘temporal evolution’ can only be attributed to the publication and the media
diffusion of central bank’s announced forecasts. All the results on section 4 below (in
particular, the dispersion’s results) were obtained by controlling for the following ‘other
sources of variation’:
• the effect associated to the forecast horizon h along each fixed-event forecast se-
quence of 24 months, i.e., the calendar effects corresponding to a decreasing fore-
casts’ uncertainty to the extent that h decreases (the fixed event’s realization date
approaches); and
• the effect associated to pi’s or g’s ex post volatility, i.e., the volatility of aggregate
shocks affecting the historical macroeconomic variable (pi or g), which can be quan-
tified by all insiders just at the date when they are surveyed (see description of Hb
hypothesis below).
13
and Filacek & Saxa (2012) did not try to exclude these effects.17
Therefore, the goal of the ‘auxiliary regression’ is to explain dispersions in the whole
sample (all 3 groups of monthly dispersions, a total of N observations) by the ex post
volatility and a quadratic trend in the forecast horizon h corresponding to each monthly
dispersion in the sample.18
The functional form of the auxiliary regression is key for the results’ robustness. Fi-
lacek & Saxa (2012) use σjs = exp(xjsβ + u¯js), s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, more specifically, log(σjs) =
xjsβ + u¯js. Since this functional form does not allow the inclusion of zero inside the de-
pendent variable’s range, the β parameters are not identified for admissible observations
of the process under study (see Figures 1-6). Furthermore, since this functional form con-
verts all zero and near-zero dispersions σjs into very ‘abnormal observations’, it becomes
problematic.19
The solution is to choose a functional form which allows zero inside the dependent
variable’s range, σjs = exp(xjsβ) + ujs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This specification is estimated
by a non-linear least squares (NLLS) procedure, plus a previous procedure enforcing
suitable seeds, thus providing global NLLS estimates and improved auxiliary regression’s
stability. The latter procedure begins with the estimation of a simple linear regression
σjs = xjsβ + ujs, s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, by ordinary least squares (OLS), which yields the values
βˆi. Since these values should be equal to the new specification’s average marginal effects,
the solution of the resulting non-linear system of equations, βi/βˆi = [
∑
js exp(xjsβ)/N ]
−1,
provides the seeds for the former procedure.20
The statistical tests are applied separately to the two available changes in net disper-
sion {u∗js}: the change from {1} month to {2} month ({s = 2|s = 1}) and the change
from {1} month to {3} month ({s = 3|s = 1}), where u∗js ≡ σjs− exp(x∗jsβ∗) are the esti-
mated errors after excluding the explaining components related to the individual ex post
volatility, the quadratic trend and the intercept, x∗jsβ∗. Although Filacek & Saxa (2012)
use the net dispersions {exp(u¯js)} in accordance with their specification, these authors
also exclude the explaining component related to the other two dummy variables (c2, c3),
thus eliminating a significant part of the effect they desire to contrast! (see footnote 18).
For either {s = 2|s = 1} or {s = 3|s = 1}, the null hypothesis that there is no
immediate change in the average net dispersion of the insiders’ forecasts generated by
the insiders’ observing the coordination signal (the central bank’s announced forecast) is
tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is either an increase or a decrease in
the average net dispersion. Thus, the paired-t test is a one-tail test and the computation
of the p-value depends on the sign of its calculated value
tcal =
ˆ¯DσF /(
σˆDσF√
n
)
where ˆ¯DσF and σˆDσF are the sample mean and sample variance of the n differences of
the dispersion pairs after and before the aforementioned observation, {DjσF }, which are
distributed N(D¯σF ,σDσF ). Therefore, tcal is distributed t-Student with n − 1 degrees of
freedom. Note n is the number of ‘quarters’ {1, 2, 3} effectively used in the sample mean
17To exclude the effects of changes in the groups of insiders effectively surveyed (those who sent at
least the forecast of one variable during the whole sample period), the inclusion of another set of dummy
variables into the auxiliary regression was considered. Annex A shows the average participation of the
insiders for Peru to illustrate how onerous the inclusion of such a number of dummies can be.
18For the sake of the regression’s stability, three dummy variables (c1, c2, c3) are included to capture
the temporal evolution over the average quarter {1, 2, 3}, where c1 corresponds to the intercept. These
dummies are the only explanatory variables considered by Filacek & Saxa (2012), without encouraging
results (see below).
19For the test based on the distances, this functional form converts every zero into −∞.
20By the way, the suitable seeds for the non-linear system of equations are βsysi = 0.025 ∗ sign(βˆi).
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after controlling for the ‘not available’ data (an issue in the case of the distance, which
also requires the central bank’s announced forecast).21
Secondly, the Hb hypothesis considers that whenever the IR publication dates cor-
respond to periods of high uncertainty, the coordination between the insiders’ forecasts
and the central bank’s announced forecasts is reinforced, so robust measures of dispersion
and distance decrease upon monetary authority’s signal. To implement this hypothesis,
all the ‘quarters’ {1, 2, 3} must be separated depending upon there was a high or low
uncertainty during the corresponding {2} months. Filacek & Saxa (2012)’s proposed
two uncertainty measures are: (a) the average dispersion for each ‘quarter’, i.e., com-
puted over the 3 cross-sections-of-forecasts sets (an uncertainty measure specific to each
forecasted variable under study), or (b) the sum of the standardized ‘quarterly average
dispersions’ of the Mk variables under study for each country k, that is, each of the Mk
‘quarterly-average-dispersions’ time series must be previously standardized (a country-
specific uncertainty measure).
To identify the ‘quarters’ with high or low uncertainty, the selected uncertainty mea-
sure must be compared with its sample mean. Although Filacek & Saxa (2012) prefer
choice (b) as the most appropriate macroeconomic uncertainty measure, the present study
considers that
• it is feasible to compute a time series of ex post volatility for any individual vari-
able from the corresponding historical data available in Consensus Forecasts (i.e.,
a moving window with 36 observations ending with those available in each month’s
Consensus Forecasts survey in the sample); and
• the set of available variables in Consensus Forecasts varies for each country (pi and
g belong to any country set considered, though).
Therefore, a proper country-specific uncertainty measure is just the sum of the standard-
ized time series of ex post volatilities for each country k’s pi and g.
Abstracting from this macroeconomic uncertainty, the set of Hb tests becomes similar
to the set of Ha tests. The need of two separated auxiliary regressions seems correct,
one for the sub-sample of high-uncertainty quarters and one for the sub-sample of low-
uncertainty quarters. Finally, since only one of the ex post volatility series included in
the macroeconomic uncertainty series is actually an explanatory variable in the Ha-test
auxiliary regression, the macroeconomic uncertainty series can be used to separate the
same net dispersion data obtained from the Ha-test auxiliary regression for implementing
the Hb tests.
IV. Results
This section presents the main results from both sets of tests (Ha y Hb) for the 5
countries considered and the 3 computed statistics with the pi and g forecasts available
on the Consensus Economics Inc.’s surveys. The number of ‘hard facts’22 obtained from
the full-sample Ha tests is small, which motivates the inclusion of ‘soft results’ or ‘weak
evidence’ corresponding to a ‘range of significance’ (p-values between 10% and 13%).23
Annexes D, E and F show the details (degrees of fredom, Tcal’s and p-values).
21The paired-t test is more robust than the non-parametric permutation test (which does not assume
normality of the 2 groups of data being compared).
22These results correspond to a significance level of 10%.
23A wider range implies the prohibitive cost of these soft results’ being false.
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Table No. 1. Ha tests with dispersion (*) & full sample 1R
Country Sn variable survey’s month horizon
effect pi g current next range
Mexico decrease x x h ≤ 12
Peru decrease x x h ≤ 12
United Kingdom increase x x h > 12
(*) Sn and Qn are robust estimators for the dispersion of Consensus Economics
Inc.’s forecasts (pi or g). Neither a hard nor a weak result has been found with Qn.
Robust Dispersion (Sn & Qn)
Table No. 1 shows that official forecasts’ publication decreased Sn dispersion of short-
term pi [g] forecasts in Mexico [Peru]. Official forecasts increased Sn dispersion of
medium-term pi forecasts in United Kingdom at the same month of their publication (see
‘current’ column). Note that the joint effect of publication and media diffusion of official
forecasts is null in all countries under study according to these tests (see ‘next’ column):
they have not decreased Sn dispersion of forecasts (fortunately, there is no hard evidence
about increased Sn dispersion, either). These results are consistent with those based on
Qn dispersion: both the publication effect and its joint effect with media diffusion on Qn
dispersion of forecasts are null in all countries under study (there is no hard evidence that
they either increase or decrease this dispersion).
On the one hand, the results above illustrate the usefulness of separating the official
forecasts’ publication effect from its joint effect with the associated media diffusion. Only
the joint effects consider the potentially important benefits from making the majority
of agents become attentive to the already published official forecasts. This idea should
be present while interpreting the following tables, despite of using ‘the disclosure’ of the
official forecasts as equivalent to either ‘the publication’ or ‘the publication and the media
diffusion’ of the official forecasts.
On the other hand, the small number of full-sample hard results suggests the tests
must be carried out with two separated samples, each with its own characteristics. This
strategy avoids the full sample’s ‘masking effect’: for instance, two opposite-sign effects
(obtained from two complementary sub-samples and significantly different from zero) can
cancel each other out, giving rise to a not-statistically-significant full-sample effect.24
Therefore, the full sample is divided into two sub-samples, depending on whether the
level of macroeconomic uncertainty is high or low. By focusing on the hard results, Table
No. 2 shows that official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Sn dispersion of short-term pi
forecasts in Chile (a) within the official forecasts’ publication month (the current month)
whenever this publication month is labeled a ‘high-uncertainty month’ (HU month), as
well as (b) within the month after the publication month (the next month) whenever the
publication month is labeled as a ‘low-uncertainty month’ (LU month). There was no
statistically significant result associated with Qn dispersion.
In Colombia official forecasts’ disclosure increased Sn dispersion of medium-term g
forecasts within the next month whenever the publication month is a HU month but
decreased it whenever the publication month is a LU month. Considering Qn dispersion,
official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Qn dispersion of medium-term g forecasts within the
next month whenever the publication month is a LU month. There were no full-sample
hard results similar to these findings for Chile and Colombia (see Table No. 1).
In Mexico official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Sn dispersion of short-term pi fore-
casts within the current month whenever the publication month is a HU month; it also
decreased Sn dispersion of medium-term g forecasts within the current month whenever
24Each sub-sample effect is obtained with degrees of freedom which are close to half of the full-sample
effect’s.
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Table No. 2. Hb tests with dispersion (*) & separated samples 5R
Country Sn variable survey’s month horizon IR level of
effect pi g current next range uncertainty
Chile
¿decrease? x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x h ≤ 12 low
Colombia increase x x h > 12 highdecrease x x h > 12 low
Mexico
decrease x x h ≤ 12 high
¿decrease? x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x h > 12 high
increase x x h > 12 low
Peru
decrease x x h ≤ 12 low
increase x x h ≤ 12 high
increase x x h > 12 high
¿increase? x x h > 12 low
¿increase? x x x h > 12 low
United Kingdom increase x x h > 12 high
Country Qn variable survey’s month horizon IR level of
effect pi g current next range uncertainty
Colombia decrease x x h > 12 low
Mexico
decrease x x h ≤ 12 high
increase x x h ≤ 12 low
¿increase? x x h > 12 low
Peru
¿decrease? x x h ≤ 12 low
decrease x x x h > 12 high
United Kingdom decrease x x h ≤ 12 high¿increase? x x h ≤ 12 low
(*) Sn and Qn are robust estimators for the dispersion of Consensus Economics Inc.’s forecasts (pi or g).
When the effect appears between signs of interrogation, it is a ‘weak evidence’ obtained with a ‘significance
range’ greater than 10% and less than 13%.
the publication month is a HU month, but it increased Sn dispersion of medium-term g
forecasts within the next month whenever the publication month is a LU month. Con-
sidering Qn dispersion, official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Qn dispersion of short-term
pi forecasts within the next month whenever the publication month is a HU month (the
analogous Sn dispersion reduction was only a weak evidence; see table). However, official
forecasts’ disclosure increased Qn dispersion of short-term pi forecasts within the next
month whenever the publication month is a LU month.
In Peru official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Sn dispersion of short-term g forecasts
within the current month whenever the publication month is a LU month, but it increased
(1) Sn dispersion of short-term pi forecasts within the next month whenever the publica-
tion month is a HU month, and (2) Sn dispersion of medium-term g forecasts within the
next month whenever the publication month is a HU month. Considering Qn dispersion,
the analogous dispersion reduction mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph is ac-
tually a weak result; considering hard results, official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Qn
dispersion of medium-term pi forecasts within both the current and next month whenever
the publication month is a HU month.
Finally, in United Kingdom official forecasts’ disclosure increased Sn dispersion
of medium-term pi forecasts within the current month whenever the publication month
is a HU month. Considering Qn dispersion, official forecasts’ disclosure decreased Qn
dispersion of short-term g forecasts within the next month whenever the publication
month is a HU month.
Distance
The Table No. 3 considers the same kind of tests as in Table No. 1 (full sample)
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Table No. 3. Ha tests with distance (*) & full sample 2R
Country Effect distance survey’s monthly horizon
pi g current next range
Chile decrease x x x h ≤ 12¿decrease? x x h > 12
Colombia decrease x x x h ≤ 12decrease x x x h > 12
Mexico decrease x x h > 12
Peru decrease x x h ≤ 12
United Kingdom ¿decrease? x x h > 12
(*) Distance between the median of Consensus Economics Inc.’s forecasts (pi or g) and the
central bank’s announced forecast. When the effect appears between signs of interrogation, it
is a ‘weak evidence’ obtained with a ‘significance range’ greater than 10% and less than 13%.
but applied to the distance between the median of Consensus Economics Inc.’s (pi or g)
forecasts and the central bank’s announced forecast (o simply, the distance). The number
of hard results increases. In Chile and Colombia official forecasts’ disclosure decreased
the distance associated with short-term pi forecasts within the current month and the next
month. Surprisingly, Colombia achieved a similar success considering medium-term g
forecasts.
In Mexico and Peru official forecasts’ disclosure decreased the distance associated
with pi forecasts within the next month (short-term forecasts in Peru and medium-term
forecasts in Mexico). In United Kingdom official forecasts’ disclosure did not decrease
the distance; fortunately, there is no hard evidence about increased distance, either.
The number of hard results from full-sample tests is reasonable and suggests the dis-
tance is an improved measure for evaluating the effect of official forecasts’ disclosure.
Considering the ‘weak evidence’, in Chile and United Kingdom official forecasts’ dis-
closure would have decreased the distance of medium-term pi forecasts (within the next
month and the current month, respectively).
The tests applied to the average distance in the complementary sub-samples (sepa-
rated according to the dichotomy between high and low macroeconomic uncertainty) are
presented in Table No 4. Although these tests use nearly the half of available observa-
tions, they avoid the possible cancellation of two opposite-sign effects and thus provide
more specific hard results.
In Chile official forecasts’ disclosure decreased the distance of short-term pi forecasts
within both the current month and the next month, whenever the publication month is
a LU month. This specific hard result is also complemented with a more specific weak
result: it would have decreased the distance of short-term pi forecasts within the next
month, but whenever the publication month is a HU month. Those results are actually
consistent with the associated hard result from full-sample tests in the preceding table.
All the following results are hard results. In Colombia official forecasts’ disclosure
decreased the distance of short-term pi forecasts within the current month, no matter what
the level of macroeconomic uncertainty; it also decreased the distance of medium-term g
forecasts within both the current month and the next month, whenever the publication
month is a HU month. These hard results are consistent with the associated hard results
from full-sample tests in the preceding table.
InUnited Kingdom official forecasts’ disclosure decreased the distance of short-term
pi forecasts within both the current month and the next month, as well as the distance of
medium-term pi forecasts within the current month, whenever the publication month is a
HU month (in both cases). Note the latter hard result is consistent with the corresponding
weak result in the preceding table.
In Mexico official forecasts’ disclosure decreased the distance of medium-term pi fore-
casts within the next month, whenever the publication month is a LU month. Similarly, in
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Table No. 4. Hb tests with distance (*) & separated samples 6R
Country Effect distance survey’s month horizon IR level of
pi g current next range uncertainty
Chile ¿decrease? x x h ≤ 12 highdecrease x x x h ≤ 12 low
Colombia
decrease x x h ≤ 12 high
¿decrease? x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x h ≤ 12 low
decrease x x x h > 12 high
Mexico ¿decrease? x x x h > 12 highdecrease x x h > 12 low
Peru
increase x x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x h ≤ 12 low
decrease x x h ≤ 12 low
¿decrease? x x h > 12 low
United Kingdom
¿increase? x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x x h ≤ 12 high
decrease x x h > 12 high
(*) Distance between the median of Consensus Economics Inc.’s forecasts (pi or g) and the central bank’s
announced forecast. When the effect appears between signs of interrogation, it is a ‘weak evidence’ obtai-
ned with a ‘significance range’ greater than 10% and less than 13%.
Peru it decreased the distance of short-term pi forecasts within the next month, whenever
the publication month is a LU month. Newly, these hard results for the two countries are
consistent with the corresponding hard results in the preceding table.
Finally, and furthermore with respect to previous paragraph, in Peru official fore-
casts’ disclosure decreased the distance of short-term g forecasts within the current month
whenever the publication month is a LU month. However, it also increased the distance
of short-term g forecasts within both the current month and the next month, whenever
the publication month is a HU month.
Table No. 5. Performance measures from Hb tests (*)
Country Month Dispersion Distance Total
Sn Qn σ
i
z d
i
z t
i
z
Chile current (1 + 0)/8 (0 + 0)/8 1/16 (1 + 0)/8 3/16next (1 + 0)/8 (0 + 0)/8 1/16 (1 + 0)/8 3/16
Colombia current (0 + 0)/8 (0 + 0)/8 0/16 (2 + 1)/8 6/16next (0 + 0)/8 (0 + 1)/8 1/16 (0 + 1)/8 3/16
Mexico current (1 + 1)/8 (0 + 0)/8 2/16 (0 + 0)/8 2/16next (0− 1)/8 (0 + 0)/8 −1/16 (0 + 1)/8 1/16
Peru current (1 + 0)/8 (0 + 1)/8 2/16 (0 + 0)/8 2/16next (−1− 1)/8 (0 + 1)/8 −1/16 (0 + 0)/8 −1/16
United Kingdom current (0− 1)/8 (0 + 0)/8 −1/16 (1 + 1)/8 3/16next (0 + 0)/8 (1 + 0)/8 1/16 (1 + 0)/8 3/16
(*) The 1st [2nd] summand on each parenthesis corresponds to the sub-total associated to the short-
term [medium-term] forecasts. The measure of performance σiz is ’calculated’ by dividing the total
score obtained by the maximum feasible score with respect to both the Sn dispersion and the Qn
dispersion.
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Epilogue
A useful way to summarize the results above is to define an adequate score based on
the total number of Hb hypothesis for every country. Let any increase [reduction] in the
coordination measure (Sn dispersion, Qn dispersion or distance) be valued as one negative
point (−1) [one positive point (+1)]. Four sub-totals are obtained from aggregating the
points across allHb tests (pi and g; high and low uncertainties), one pair for forecasts made
at the same month of their publication (see ‘current’ row) -one for short-term forecasts and
one for medium-term forecasts- and another pair for forecasts made at the next month of
their publication (see ‘next’ row) -one for short-term forecasts and one for medium-term
forecasts-. The absolute scores for each country i are obtained by summing each pair
of sub-totals: the total points from forecasts made at the ‘current’ month and the total
points from forecasts made at the ‘next’ month.25 However, a relative score requires
a normalization by dividing each country i’s absolute score by the total number of Hb
tests leading to either the maximum or the minimum absolute score. Let σiz be country i’s
dispersion relative score for month z, let diz be country i’s distance relative score for month
z; these two measures can be summed into the total measure tiz by simple arithmetic.26
Table No. 5 shows the big picture of these countries’ limited success while managing
insiders ’s expectations, that is, the forecasts made by professional forecasters and financial
markets’ participants; notwithstanding the foregoing, the ‘ranking’ favors Colombia, Chile
and United Kingdom. These results should be appreciated from the view of Kumar et
al. (2015)’s results referring to the expectation surveys to CEOs in New Zealand: their
pi expectations display a low degree of anchoring as well as high levels of short-term and
long-term dispersion (in spite of NZ inflation targeting ’s being 25 years old). By using
many quantitative criteria, Kumar et al. (2015) find that CEOs’ expectations are more
similar to households’ than to insiders ’, and that monetary authority’s communication
strategy in New Zealand would not have been sufficiently effective with respect to the
insiders ’ either.27
The explanations for these findings concerning the second link of the coordination
chain: firms in New Zealand obtain scarce net benefits from coordinating their forecasts
with the insiders’ (gross benefits from coordination are close to coordination costs). A
reasonable explanation is related to the first link of the coordination chain: the insiders
in New Zealand obtain scarce net benefits from coordinating their forecasts with the pri-
mary insider’s, i.e., the central bank’s official forecasts. For the cases of Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru and United Kingdom, the results concerning the first link of the coordi-
nation chain clearly point out that the insiders therein obtain scarce net benefits from
coordinating their forecasts with the central bank’s, thus anticipating the state of affairs
concerning the following links of the coordination chain of expectations.
25For the watchful reader, he can just sum the points associated to each significative p-value -bold
letters- (while considering the corresponding Tcal ’s sign, immediately to its left) down through the two
p-values columns in Tables D.2, E.2 y F.2 (Anexos D, E y F).
26The fractions tiz have common denominator 16, so let n be its denominator in general. Then any tiz
can be transformed to the usual scale via the equationm = 20(n+16)/32, so {−1, 1, 2, 3, 6} are equivalent
to {9.4,10.6,11.3,11.9,13.8}.
27As already referenced in footnote 7, Huang & Trehan (2008) consider U.S. firms’ expectations about
pi are closer to professional forecasters’ because firms hire these forecasters to gauge future pi. Kumar
et al. (2015) report that only 20% of their surveyed firms in New Zealand rely on professional forecasts
about pi.
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V. Conclusions
The goal is to evaluate the signal effect of the central-bank-forecast disclosure on
both (1) the dispersion of ‘fixed-event forecasts’ elaborated by the insiders (surveyed by
Consensus Economics Inc.) with respect to pi and g, as well as (2) the convergence of
these insiders’ forecasts towards the forecasts announced by the central banks (decreases
in the distance) in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and United Kingdom from 2004 to
2014.
In spite of the important achievements of inflation targeting in all these countries,
there are few occasions in which both net dispersion and net distance decrease (even for
Colombia, Chile and United Kingdom), thus indicating that monetary authorities therein
do have difficulties in managing private expectations. In this regard, their monetary-
policy and expectation-management contexts correspond to Hubert (2011)’s endogenous
influence where, disregarding their forecasting performances, the only source of monetary
authorities’ influence is related to their qualitative policy signals, and thus these authori-
ties must respond by using a policy rule depending upon private forecasts instead of these
authorities’ own internal forecasts. The disclosure of the central bank ‘perceptions’ be-
coming a monetary policy instrument is a possibility only when both net dispersion and
net distance frequently and regularly decrease. This is the unique instance in which this
disclosure can generate ‘good-news’ shocks to compensate ‘bad-news’ shocks (the converse
is also true), thus making the monetary authority be able to drive private expectations
about key variables towards their fundamental values.
These findings concern the first link of the coordination chain of expectation (the
transmission of monetary authority’s quantitative signals) since those effects are mea-
sured with Consensus Economics Inc.’s forecasts survey of the professional forecasters
and the financial-market participants (referred all together as ‘insiders’). So it may be
argued that the confirmation of the conclusions above requires to consider the forecasts
and expectations of a wide range of economic agents, such as surveys of households and/or
firms about their economic perceptions. However, New Zealand’s case shows this is not
necessary: (1) within the first link of the coordination chain, if the insiders’ net bene-
fits from coordinating their forecasts with the central bank’s official forecasts are zero or
negative, then it is possible to anticipate that (2) within the second link of this coordi-
nation chain, the firms’ net benefits from coordinating their forecasts with the insiders’
forecasts will be zero or negative, and that (3) within the third link of this coordination
chain, the households’ net benefits from coordinating their forecasts with the firms’ fore-
casts will be zero or negative (a simplifying assumption here is that retail firms are the
same as the wholesale firms). And all these ideas are consistent with the known sensi-
bility of households’ expectations to food and energy commodities prices’ fluctuations, as
well as their persistent biases with respect to these fluctuations (a key difficulty faced by
inflation-targeting central banks).
The extension of the study to variables other than pi and g (whose forecasts are also
included inside the announcements - IR - published by inflation-targeting central banks)
can be justified by the requirement that both the announced forecasts and the detailed
modeling information reflect the effort to improve the forecasting precision of the whole
macroeconomic policy scenario (i.e., including sectoral real growth forecasts, individual
forecasts for a wide range of items included in the consumer price index’s basket, etc.). It
would increase the central banks’ comprehensive ‘perception’ about the economy (which
they publish and disseminate by press conferences) and facilitate the formation of a co-
ordination chain of expectations. Eventually, it would potentially change the context of
the management of private expectations in the medium term towards the one called en-
dogenous influence, under which monetary authorities are able (and obliged) to respond
by using a policy rule depending upon their own internal forecasts (see Hubert 2011).
There are many recommendations from this study. First, it is mandatory to design an
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internal mechanism of incentives favoring (a) the development of forecasting models based
on both their precision and their robustness, and (b) the frequent ex post evaluation of
internal forecasts. Second, the elements associated with media diffusion of the announced
forecasts (already disclosed to the public) must be appropriately considered, in particular
(i) that the publication date should always be among the first days of the corresponding
month, so as to maximize the probability of being considered by the majority of the
targeted set of insiders (for instance, those surveyed by Consensus Economics Inc.); (ii)
that the appropriate use of media favor the knowledge of the announced forecasts by
the maximum number of agents, for instance by announcing in private TV stations in
absence of a self-owned TV station, such as the case of Colombia (see the footnotes to
the corresponding Annex C’s Table); and (iii) that the format of the announced forecasts
provides them for the same number of years into the future (‘fixed events’), excluding the
preliminary numbers for the year which is ending this month or has already ended one or
two months ago (nowcasting).
In as much as both the monetary authorities can pass through the Colombian monetary
authorities’ media-diffusion experience and all aforementioned countries’ central banks
can improve their strategies of predictive modeling and publication of comprehensive
macroeconomic scenarios to support their policy decisions, an increase in the number
of significant net distance and dispersion reductions will be observed on each link of the
coordination chain. The changes associated with financial stability goals should not affect
the inflation targeting efforts. The disclosure improvements will reduce the sensitiveness
of households’ expectations before commodity prices’ ups and downs, and convert the
context of private expectations management into one of endogenous influence: inflation
targeting v2.0!
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ANNEX A: Insiders surveyed by Consensus Economics Inc. about Peru’s
macroeconomic variables
Surveyed insiders: participation and absences
Item Insider’s Months of As a % of total Months of As a % of the
# Name participation number of months absence months of particip.
(T = 129 1/) (%)
1 Larraín Vial 9 7.0 0 0.0
2 Oxford Economics 9 7.0 1 11.1
3 BTG Pactual 17 13.2 2 11.8
4 Barclays Capital 6 4.7 8 133.3
5 Deutsche Bank 32 24.8 3 9.4
6 HBSC 60 46.5 13 21.7
7 BofA - Merrill Lynch 29 22.5 1 3.4
8 Inteligo SAB 51 39.5 7 13.7
9 Capital Economics 58 45.0 7 12.1
10 IDEAglobal 32 24.8 4 12.5
11 Global Insight 104 80.6 13 12.5
12 Dresdner Bank 33 25.6 6 18.2
13 Credit Suisse 52 40.3 24 46.2
14 Scotiabank 80 62.0 18 22.5
15 Banco de Crédito del Perú 73 56.6 56 76.7
16 EIU 127 98.4 2 1.6
17 Apoyo Consultoría 102 79.1 27 26.5
18 Banco Wiesse Sudameris 31 24.0 1 3.2
19 CS First Boston 19 14.7 1 5.3
20 JP Morgan Chase 121 93.8 8 6.6
21 Macroconsult 87 67.4 42 48.3
22 BankBoston 12 9.3 0 0.0
23 BBVA Banco Continental 92 71.3 37 40.2
24 CESLA (Klein-UAM) 117 90.7 12 10.3
25 IPE 106 82.2 23 21.7
26 Centura SAB 66 51.2 5 7.6
27 Santander Perú 19 14.7 1 5.3
28 Citigroup 67 51.9 62 92.5
a Consensus Forecasts average
b Last month’s average
c Average three months ago
d Maximum
e Minimum
f Standard deviation
g BCRP’s forecasts 2/
h CAF’s forecasts
i IMF’s forecasts
j ECLAC’s forecasts
Source: Latin American Consensus Forecasts (LACF ).
Notes: 1/ Between January 2004 and December 2014 there are T = 132 months. 2/ Assigned to this row in
the database (See Annex C).
ANNEX B: Peru’s macroeconomic variables whose forecasts are surveyed by
Consensus Economics Inc.
Macroeconomic variables
Number Description
1 Gross Domestic Product (12-mo. avg. % change)
2 Private Consumption (12-mo. avg. % change)
3 Gross Fixed Investment (12-mo. avg. % change)
4 Manufacturing Production (12-mo. avg. % change)
5 Metropolitan Lima Consumer Price Index (YoY % change)
6 Goods Exports (US$ bllns. FOB)
7 Goods Imports (US$ bllns. FOB)
8 Trade Balance (US$ bllns. FOB)
9 Current Account Balance (US$ bllns. FOB)
10 IMF-related International Reserves (US$ bllns. FOB)
Source: Latin American Consensus Forecasts (LACF ).
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ANNEX C: Assignment of IR forecasts to Consensus Economics Inc. surveys
Dates associated with Chile’s IRs
Number IPoM Presentation Tentative assignment LACF Survey Date Final assignment of
the the of the IR close to the present. the IR from
Senate 1/ from LACF survey 2/ to the Senate LACF survey 2/
Sep03 10sep03 (Sep03) 15sep03 (Sep03)
1 Jan04 14jan04 Jan04 19jan04 Jan04
2 May04 01jun04 Jun04 21jun04 Jun04
3 Sep04 14sep04 Sep04 20sep04 Sep40
5 Jan05 19jan05 Feb05 17jan05 Feb05
6 May05 18may05 Jun05 16may05 Jun05
7 Sep05 31aug05 Sep05 15aug05 Sep05
9 Jan06 18jan06 Feb06 16jan06 Feb06
10 May06 17may06 Jun06 15may06 Jun06
11 Sep06 13sep06 Sep06 18sep06 Sep06
13 Jan07 17jan07 Feb07 15jan07 Feb07
14 May07 16may07 Jun07 21may07 May07
15 Sep07 05sep07 Sep07 17sep07 Sep07
17 Jan08 16jan08 Feb08 21jan08 Jan08
18 May08 12may08 May08 19may08 May08
19 Sep08 11sep08 Sep08 15sep08 Sep08
20 Nov08 14nov08 3/ Nov08 17nov08 Nov08
21 Jan09 14jan09 Jan09 19jan09 Jan09
22 May09 13may09 May09 18may09 May09
23 Sep09 15sep09 Sep09 21sep09 Sep09
24 Dec09 16dec09 Jan10 14dec09 Jan10
25 Mar10 06apr10 Apr10 19apr10 Apr10
26 Jun10 16jun10 Jul10 21jun10 Jun10
27 Sep10 08sep10 Sep10 20sep10 Sep10
28 Dec10 20dec10 Jan11 13dec10 Jan11
29 Mar11 04apr11 Apr11 11apr11 Apr11
30 Jun11 20jun11 Jul11 20jun11 Jun11
31 Sep11 07sep11 Sep11 19sep11 Sep11
32 Dec11 20dec11 Jan12 19dec11 Jan12
33 Mar12 03apr12 Apr12 16apr12 Apr12
34 Jun12 18jun12 Jul12 18jun12 Jun12
35 Sep12 05sep12 Sep12 17sep12 Sep12
36 Dec12 18dec12 Jan13 17dec12 Jan13
37 Mar13 02apr13 Apr13 15apr13 Apr13
38 Jun13 01jul13 Jul13 15jul13 Jul13
39 Sep13 04sep13 Sep13 16sep13 Sep13
40 Dec13 03dec13 Dec13 16dec13 Dec13
41 Mar14 31mar14 Apr14 17mar14 Apr14
42 Jun14 16jun14 Jul14 16jun14 Jun14
43 Sep14 03sep14 Sep14 15sep14 Sep14
44 Dec14 15dec14 Dec14 15dec14 Dec14
Mar15 30mar15 (Apr15)
1/ Presentation dates of the ‘Monetary Policy Report’ (IPoM) to the Senate Committee on Finance; see IPoM prefaces.
2/ Consensus Economics Inc. carries out the Latin-American-country survey every month’s 3rd Monday (Consensus 2015). A tentative
assignment of the central bank IR forecasts to the Consensus Economics Inc. surveys considers that these forecasts will surely affect the
survey’s forecasts from the very month of an IR publication (until they become affected by the following IR’s forecasts) if the IR publication
date falls before or at the 14th day of that month; otherwise, they will surely affect the survey from the following month to the publication
month (until they become affected by the following IR’s). The final assignment uses the closing date of the corresponding Consensus
Economics Inc.’s survey.
3/ The Sep08’s IPoM forecasts update, which took place in November 2008, was extraordinary. Although it was not presented to the Senate
Committee on Finance, there was a press conference on Friday Nov. 14, 2008, the publication day (one day after that month’s Monetary
Policy Meeting). For all other cases, IPoM publication is simultaneous with the moment the president of the Banco Central de Chile
initiates his address to the Senate Committee on Finance (Banco Central de Chile, 2015).
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Dates associated with Colombia’s IRs
Number ISI Present. to G.M. IR tentative assignment LACF Survey Date close IR final assignment
the Board presentation 1/ from LACF survey 2/ to the G.M. presentation from LACF survey 2/
Sep03 n.d. 11nov03 (Nov03) 17nov03 (Nov03)
1 Dec03 n.d. 07feb04 Feb04 16feb04 Feb04
2 Mar04 n.d. 04may04 May04 17may04 May04
3 Jun04 n.d. 03aug04 Aug04 16aug04 Aug04
4 Sep04 n.d. 11nov04 Nov04 15nov04 Nov04
5 Dec04 n.d. 07feb05 ∼ ab Feb05 21feb05 Feb05
6 Mar05 n.d. 04may05 ∼ ab May05 16may05 May05
7 Jun05 n.d. 03aug05 b Aug05 15aug05 Aug05
8 Sep05 n.d. 11nov05 b Nov05 21nov05 Nov05
9 Dec05 n.d. 10feb06 b Feb06 20feb06 Feb06
10 Mar06 n.d. 12may06 b May06 15may06 May06
11 Jun06 n.d. 14aug06 Aug06 21aug06 Aug06
12 Sep06 n.d. 10nov06 ∼ a Nov06 20nov06 Nov06
13 Dec06 n.d. 09feb07 a Feb07 19feb07 Feb07
14 Mar07 n.d. 11may07 b May07 21may07 May07
15 Jun07 n.d. 13aug07 b Aug07 20aug07 Aug07
16 Sep07 n.d. 02nov07 b Nov07 19nov07 Nov07
17 Dec07 n.d. 08feb08 a Feb08 18feb08 Feb08
18 Mar08 n.d. 12may08 a May08 19may08 May08
19 Jun08 n.d. 01y14aug08 Aug08 18aug08 Aug08
20 Sep08 24oct08 10nov08 Nov08 17nov08 Nov08
21 Dec08 30jan09 12feb09 Feb09 16feb09 Feb09
22 Mar09 30apr09 08may09 May09 18may09 May09
23 Jun09 n.d. 03aug09 Aug09 17aug09 Aug09
24 Sep09 n.d. 09nov09 3/ Nov09 16nov09 Nov09
25 Dec09 29jan10 12feb10 Feb10 15feb10 Feb10
26 Mar10 30apr10 10may10 May10 17may10 May10
27 Jun10 23jul10 30jul10 Aug10 19jul10 Aug10
28 Sep10 29oct10 05nov10 Nov10 15nov10 Nov10
29 Dec10 31jan11 04feb11 Feb11 21feb11 Feb11
30 Mar11 29apr11 09may11 May11 16may11 May11
31 Jun11 29jul11 01aug11 Aug11 15aug11 Aug11
32 Sep11 28oct11 11nov11 Nov11 21nov11 Nov11
33 Dec11 30jan12 13feb12 Feb12 20feb12 Feb12
34 Mar12 30apr12 18may12 Jun12 21may12 May12
35 Jun12 27jul12 30jul12 Aug12 16jul12 Aug12
36 Sep12 26oct12 09nov12 Nov12 19nov12 Nov12
37 Dec12 28jan13 08feb13 Feb13 18feb13 Feb13
38 Mar13 26apr13 29apr13 May13 15apr13 May13
39 Jun13 26jul13 09aug13 Aug13 19aug13 Aug13
40 Sep13 25oct13 08nov13 Nov13 18nov13 Nov13
41 Dec13 31jan14 14feb14 Feb14 17feb14 Feb14
42 Mar14 25apr14 09may14 May14 19may14 May14
43 Jun14 31jul14 04aug14 Aug14 18aug14 Aug14
44 Sep14 30oct14 07nov14 Nov14 17nov14 Nov14
Dec14 30jan15 02feb15 (Feb15)
1/ Included in the first 3 pages of the ‘Inflation Report’ (ISI ), it is the date of the ISI presentation to the Congress. Furthermore, the
corresponding presentation of the Banco de la República (BdR) General Manager (G.M.) includes the ISI presentation date to the public.
The latter date corresponds to the ISI publication.
2/ See note 2 to the preceding table.
3/ Until September 2009’s ISI there are doubts about the publication dates because the presentation-ISI link is usually broken or the
presentations do not specify any date. These dates can explicitly correspond to [a] presentations of the Informe de política monetaria y
rendición de cuentas, [b] presentations of the report about Situación actual y perspectivas de la economía colombiana, or to none of
these, ∼ ab. In these cases the press releases available at the BdR website were used (first choice in the ‘pop-up list’ under the mark of
Publicaciones investigación, where it is possible to list any month’s releases ¡from the year 2000!).
There are not exact publication dates for the first ISI s -nor for the associated reports [a],[b]- beyond the reasonable times for those ISI s
previous to November 10, 2006, the reason being the press releases do not follow the presentations of neither of these reports. There are
some indications about presentations of a ‘quarterly report about inflation’; for instance, on February 10, 2006, it mentions: “On this day,
the BdR’s G.M., doctor José Darío Uribe, presented the Inflation Report corresponding to the IV quarter of 2005 in Bogotá city. From the
beginnings of 2004, doctor Uribe has been making quarterly presentations of this report containing a detailed analysis of inflation and
economic growth as well as their perspectives, which are the basis for monetary policy decision-making by the BdR’s Board. The G.M.’s
presentation was broadcasted around the country through via the public TV channels.” From the end of 2003, the forecasts available in
the publications (a) or (b) are considered as complements to the ISI forecasts.
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Dates associated with United Kingdom’s IRs 1/
Number IR Press IR tentative G7-CF Survey Date IR final
Conference assignment from close to the Press assignment from
G7− CF survey 1/ Conference G7− CF survey 1/
Nov03 12nov03 (Dec03) 10nov03 (Dec03)
1 Feb04 11feb04 Mar04 09feb04 Mar04
2 May04 12may04 Jun04 10may04 Jun04
3 Aug04 11aug04 Sep04 09aug04 Sep04
4 Nov04 10nov04 Dec04 08nov04 Dec04
5 Feb05 16feb05 Mar05 14feb05 Mar05
6 May05 11may05 Jun05 09may05 Jun05
7 Aug05 10aug05 Sep05 08aug05 Sep05
8 Nov05 16nov05 Dec05 14nov05 Dec05
9 Feb06 15feb06 Mar06 13feb06 Mar06
10 May06 10may06 Jun06 08may06 Jun06
11 Aug06 09aug06 Sep06 14aug06 Sep06
12 Nov06 15nov06 Dec06 13nov06 Dec06
13 Feb07 14feb07 Mar07 12feb07 Mar07
14 May07 16may07 Jun07 14may07 Jun07
15 Aug07 08aug07 Sep07 13aug07 Aug07
16 Nov07 14nov07 Dec07 12nov07 Dec07
17 Feb08 13feb08 Mar08 11feb08 Mar08
18 May08 14may08 Jun08 12may08 Jun08
19 Aug08 13aug08 Sep08 11aug08 Sep08
20 Nov08 12nov08 Dec08 10nov08 Dec08
21 Feb09 11feb09 Mar09 09feb09 Mar09
22 May09 13may09 Jun09 11may09 Jun09
23 Aug09 12aug09 Sep09 10aug09 Sep09
24 Nov09 11nov09 Dec09 09nov09 Dec09
25 Feb10 10feb10 Mar10 08feb10 Mar10
26 May10 12may10 Jun10 10may10 Jun10
27 Aug10 11aug10 Sep10 09aug10 Sep10
28 Nov10 10nov10 Dec10 08nov10 Dec10
29 Feb11 16feb11 Mar11 14feb11 Mar11
30 May11 11may11 Jun11 09may11 Jun11
31 Aug11 10aug11 Sep11 08aug11 Sep11
32 Nov11 16nov11 Dec11 14nov11 Dec11
33 Feb12 15feb12 Mar12 13feb12 Mar12
34 May12 16may12 Jun12 14may12 Jun12
35 Aug12 08aug12 Sep12 13aug12 Aug12
36 Nov12 14nov12 Dec12 12nov12 Dec12
37 Feb13 13feb13 Mar13 11feb13 Mar13
38 May13 15may13 Jun13 13may13 Jun13
39 Aug13 07aug13 Aug13 12aug13 Aug13
40 Nov13 13nov13 Dec13 11nov13 Dec13
41 Feb14 12feb14 Mar14 10feb14 Mar14
42 May14 14may14 Jun14 12may14 Jun14
43 Aug14 13aug14 Sep14 11aug14 Sep14
44 Nov14 12nov14 Dec14 10nov14 Dec14
Feb15 12feb15 (Mar15)
1/ Consensus Economics Inc. carries out the G7-country survey every month’s 2nd Monday (Consensus 2015). A tentative
assignment of the central bank IR forecasts to the Consensus Economics Inc. surveys considers that these forecasts will
surely affect the survey’s forecasts from the very month of an IR publication (until they become affected by the following
IR’s forecasts) if the IR publication date falls before or at the 7th day of that month; otherwise, they will surely affect the
survey from the following monthto the publication month (until they become affected by the following IR’s). The final
assignment uses the closing date of the corresponding Consensus Economics Inc.’s survey.
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Dates associated with Mexico’s IRs
Number IR Data Publi- IR tentative LACF Survey Date IR final assign-
as of: cation assignment from close to the ment from
LACF survey 1/ Publication LACF survey 1/
JulSep03 24oct03 31oct03 (Nov03) 20oct03 (Nov03)
1 OctDec03 26jan04 31jan04 Feb04 19jan04 Feb04
2 JanMar04 26apr04 30apr04 May04 19apr04 May04
3 AprJun04 26jul04 28jul04 Aug04 19jul04 Aug04
4 JulSep04 25oct04 31oct04 Nov04 18oct04 Nov04
5 OctDec04 28jan05 31jan05 Feb05 17jan05 Feb05
6 JanMar05 26apr05 27apr05 May05 18apr05 May05
7 AprJun05 26jul05 27jul05 Aug05 18jul05 Aug05
8 JulSep05 28oct05 31oct05 Nov05 17oct05 Nov05
9 OctDec05 27jan06 31jan06 Feb06 16jan06 Feb06
10 JanMar06 24apr06 26apr06 May06 24apr06 May06
11 AprJun06 28jul06 31jul06 Aug06 17jul06 Aug06
12 JulSep06 27oct06 31oct06 Nov06 16oct06 Nov06
13 OctDec06 29jan07 31jan07 Feb07 15jan07 Feb07
14 JanMar07 27apr07 30apr07 May07 16apr07 May07
15 AprJun07 27jul07 31jul07 Aug07 16jul07 Aug07
16 JulSep07 30oct07 31oct07 Nov07 15oct07 Nov07
17 OctDec07 29jan08 30jan08 Feb08 21jan08 Feb08
18 JanMar08 29apr08 30apr08 May08 21apr08 May08
19 AprJun08 29jul08 30jul08 Aug08 21jul08 Aug08
20 JulSep08 28oct08 29oct08 Nov08 20oct08 Nov08
21 OctDec08 26jan09 27jan09 Feb09 19jan09 Feb09
22 JanMar09 29apr09 29apr09 May09 20apr09 May09
23 AprJun09 29jul09 29jul09 Aug09 20jul09 Aug09
24 JulSep09 27oct09 28oct09 (Nov09) 19oct09 (Nov09)
25 2/ JulSep09 01dec09 02dec09 Dec09 14dec09 Dec09
26 OctDec09 26jan10 27jan10 Feb10 18jan10 Feb10
27 JanMar10 27apr10 28apr10 May10 19apr10 May10
28 AprJun10 28jul10 28jul10 Aug10 19jul10 Aug10
29 JulSep10 26oct10 27oct10 Nov10 18oct10 Nov10
30 OctDec10 08feb11 09feb11 Feb11 21feb11 Feb11
31 JanMar11 09may11 11may11 May11 16may11 May11
32 AprJun11 08aug11 10aug11 Aug11 15aug11 Aug11
33 JulSep11 07nov11 09nov11 Nov11 21nov11 Nov11
34 OctDec11 13feb12 15feb12 Feb12 20feb12 Feb12
35 JanMar12 14may12 16may12 Jun12 21may12 May12
36 AprJun12 13aug12 15aug12 Aug12 20aug12 Aug12
37 JulSep12 05nov12 07nov12 Nov12 19nov12 Nov12
38 OctDec12 11feb13 13feb13 Feb13 18feb13 Feb13
39 JanMar13 06may13 08may13 May13 20may13 May13
40 AprJun13 05aug13 07aug13 Aug13 19aug13 Aug13
41 JulSep13 04nov13 06nov13 Nov13 18nov13 Nov13
42 OctDec13 10feb14 12feb14 Feb14 17feb14 Feb14
43 JanMar14 19may14 21may14 Jun14 19may14 Jun14
44 AprJun14 11aug14 13aug14 Aug14 18aug14 Aug14
45 JulSep14 17nov14 19nov14 Dec14 17nov14 Dec14
OctDec14 16feb15 18feb15 (Mar15)
1/ See first table’s footnote 2 on this annex.
2/ The JulSep09’s IR forecasts were subsequently published in this addendum. For this reason, the AprJun09’s
IR forecasts are assigned to the Consensus Economics Inc.’s surveys from Aug09 to even Nov09.
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Dates associated with Peru’s IRs
Number IR Press IR tentative assignment LACF Survey Date close IR final assignment
Release from LACF survey 1/ to the Press Release from LACF survey 1/
Aug03 29aug03 (Sep03) 18aug03 (Sep03)
1 Jan04 06feb04 Feb04 16feb04 Feb04
2 May04 04jun04 Jun04 21jun04 Jun04
3 Aug04 10sep04 Sep04 20sep04 Sep04
4 Jan05 04feb05 Feb05 21feb05 Feb05
5 May05 03jun05 Jun05 20jun05 Jun05
6 Aug05 02sep05 Sep05 19sep05 Sep05
7 Jan06 03feb06 Feb06 20feb06 Feb06
8 May06 02jun06 Jun06 19jun06 Jun06
9 Sep06 06oct06 Oct06 16oct06 Oct06
10 Jan07 09feb07 Feb07 19feb07 Feb07
11 May07 08jun07 Jun07 18jun07 Jun07
12 Sep07 05oct07 Oct07 15oct07 Oct07
13 Jan08 08feb08 Feb08 18feb08 Feb08
14 May08 13jun08 Jun08 16jun08 Jun08
15 Sep08 10oct08 Oct08 20oct08 Oct08
16 Mar09 13mar09 Mar09 16mar09 Mar09
17 Jun09 12jun09 Jun09 15jun09 Jun09
18 Sep09 18sep09 Oct09 21sep09 Sep09
19 Dec09 18dec09 Jan10 14dec09 Jan10
20 Mar10 26mar10 Apr10 15mar10 Apr10
21 Jun10 18jun10 Jul10 21jun10 Jun10
22 Sep10 17sep10 Oct10 20sep10 Sep10
23 Dec10 17dec10 Jan11 13dec10 Jan11
24 Mar11 18mar11 Apr11 21mar11 Mar11
25 Jun11 17jun11 Jul11 20jun11 Jun11
26 Sep11 16sep11 Oct11 19sep11 Sep11
27 Dec11 16dec11 Jan12 19dec11 Dec11
28 Mar12 23mar12 Apr12 19mar12 Apr12
29 Jun12 15jun12 Jun12 18jun12 Jun12
30 Sep12 14sep12 Sep12 17sep12 Sep12
31 Dec12 14dec12 Dec12 17dec12 Dec12
32 Mar13 22mar13 Apr13 18mar13 Apr13
33 Jun13 21jun13 Jul13 17jun13 Jul13
34 Sep13 20sep13 Oct13 16sep13 Oct13
35 Dec13 20dec13 Jan14 16dec13 Jan14
36 Apr14 25apr14 May14 22apr14 May14
37 Jul14 18jul14 Aug14 21jul14 Jul14
38 Oct14 17oct14 Nov14 20oct14 Oct14
Jan15 23jan15 (Feb15)
May15 22may15 (Jun15)
1/ See first table’s footnote 2 on this annex.
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ANNEX D: Tests with Sn dispersion of forecasts (pi & g)
Table D.1. Ha tests with Sn dispersion (full sample 1)
Current vs. Previous Next vs. Previous
({s = 2|s = 1}) ({s = 3|s = 1})
Variable Country/d.f. Tcal p1 Tcal p2
(p− value) (p− value)
Short-term sample (h ≤ 12)
GDP growth
Chile/34 -0.392 0.349 -0.101 0.460
Colombia/39 -0.081 0.468 -0.523 0.302
Mexico/38 0.377 0.354 -0.320 0.376
Peru/32 -1.591 0.061 -0.202 0.420
United Kingdom/29 -0.204 0.420 -0.235 0.408
CPI inflation
Chile/34 -0.630 0.266 -0.284 0.389
Colombia/39 -0.508 0.307 -0.543 0.295
Mexico/38 -1.332 0.095 -0.621 0.269
Peru/32 0.666 0.255 0.646 0.262
United Kingdom/29 -0.103 0.459 -1.022 0.158
Medium-term sample (h > 12)
GDP growth
Chile/28 0.540 0.297 -0.021 0.492
Colombia/39 0.089 0.465 -0.391 0.349
Mexico/40 -0.700 0.244 0.101 0.460
Peru/31 0.770 0.224 1.045 0.152
United Kingdom/39 -0.097 0.462 0.381 0.353
CPI inflation
Chile/28 -0.163 0.436 0.036 0.486
Colombia/39 -0.641 0.263 0.330 0.372
Mexico/40 0.085 0.466 -0.716 0.239
Peru/31 0.656 0.258 0.779 0.221
United Kingdom/39 1.543 0.065 0.227 0.411
* Weak evidence.
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Table D.2. Hb tests with Sn dispersion (separated samples 5)
Current vs. Previous Next vs. Previous
({s = 2|s = 1}) ({s = 3|s = 1})
Variable Country/d.f. Tcal p1 Tcal p2
(p− value) (p− value)
Short-term sample (h ≤ 12)
GDP growth
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/17 -1.191 0.125* -0.402 0.346
Colombia/17 -1.005 0.165 -1.087 0.146
Mexico/19 -0.271 0.395 0.556 0.292
Peru/15 0.354 0.364 -0.086 0.466
United Kingdom/14 0.355 0.364 -0.130 0.449
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 0.526 0.303 0.330 0.373
Colombia/21 0.462 0.324 -0.026 0.490
Mexico/18 0.783 0.222 -0.829 0.209
Peru/16 -2.256 0.019 -0.200 0.422
United Kingdom/14 -0.623 0.272 -0.191 0.426
CPI inflation
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/17 -1.707 0.053 0.308 0.381
Colombia/17 -0.774 0.225 -0.791 0.220
Mexico/19 -1.769 0.046 -1.306 0.104*
Peru/15 0.860 0.202 1.389 0.093
United Kingdom/14 0.041 0.484 -0.949 0.179
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 0.641 0.266 -1.380 0.094
Colombia/21 -0.079 0.469 -0.085 0.467
Mexico/18 -0.150 0.441 0.615 0.273
Peru/16 0.260 0.399 0.131 0.449
United Kingdom/14 -0.129 0.450 -0.425 0.338
Medium-term sample (h > 12)
GDP growth
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/12 0.772 0.228 0.583 0.285
Colombia/15 0.897 0.192 1.666 0.058
Mexico/22 -1.655 0.056 -1.046 0.153
Peru/13 -0.434 0.336 1.487 0.080
United Kingdom/15 -0.162 0.437 -0.026 0.490
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 -0.023 0.491 -0.428 0.338
Colombia/23 -0.398 0.347 -1.751 0.047
Mexico/17 0.204 0.420 1.479 0.079
Peru/17 1.309 0.104* 0.333 0.372
United Kingdom/23 0.020 0.492 0.516 0.305
CPI inflation
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/12 0.113 0.456 0.744 0.236
Colombia/15 0.109 0.457 0.233 0.409
Mexico/22 0.351 0.364 -0.310 0.380
Peru/13 -1.063 0.153 -0.895 0.193
United Kingdom/15 1.350 0.098 0.264 0.398
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 -0.254 0.401 -0.472 0.322
Colombia/23 -0.791 0.219 0.239 0.407
Mexico/17 -0.116 0.454 -0.653 0.261
Peru/17 1.193 0.125* 1.249 0.114*
United Kingdom/23 0.784 0.221 0.014 0.495
* Weak evidence.
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ANNEX E: Tests with Qn dispersion of forecasts (pi & g)
Table E.1. Ha tests with Qn dispersion (full sample 1)
Current vs. Previous Next vs. Previous
({s = 2|s = 1}) ({s = 3|s = 1})
Variable Country/d.f. Tcal p1 Tcal p2
(p− value) (p− value)
Short-term sample (h ≤ 12)
GDP growth
Chile/34 -0.544 0.295 -0.572 0.285
Colombia/39 -0.318 0.376 0.327 0.373
Mexico/38 0.047 0.481 0.292 0.386
Peru/32 -0.592 0.279 -0.296 0.384
United Kingdom/29 -0.512 0.306 0.279 0.391
CPI inflation
Chile/34 -0.115 0.454 0.051 0.480
Colombia/39 -0.342 0.367 -0.469 0.321
Mexico/38 0.779 0.220 0.308 0.380
Peru/32 0.546 0.295 -0.046 0.482
United Kingdom/29 -0.600 0.277 -0.598 0.277
Medium-term sample (h > 12)
GDP growth
Chile/28 0.363 0.360 0.081 0.468
Colombia/39 -0.346 0.366 -0.684 0.249
Mexico/40 -0.788 0.218 -0.018 0.493
Peru/31 0.138 0.446 -0.027 0.489
United Kingdom/39 0.118 0.453 0.140 0.445
CPI inflation
Chile/28 1.097 0.141 0.116 0.454
Colombia/39 -0.451 0.327 0.415 0.340
Mexico/40 0.498 0.311 0.882 0.192
Peru/31 0.116 0.454 -0.206 0.419
United Kingdom/39 0.121 0.452 -0.363 0.359
* Weak evidence.
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Table E.2. Hb tests with Qn dispersion (separated samples 5)
Current vs. Previous Next vs. Previous
({s = 2|s = 1}) ({s = 3|s = 1})
Variable Country/d.f. Tcal p1 Tcal p2
(p− value) (p− value)
Short-term sample (h ≤ 12)
GDP growth
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/17 -0.728 0.238 -0.427 0.337
Colombia/17 -0.355 0.364 0.223 0.413
Mexico/19 0.794 0.218 0.912 0.187
Peru/15 0.628 0.270 -0.117 0.454
United Kingdom/14 0.019 0.493 -1.366 0.097
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 0.670 0.256 0.299 0.385
Colombia/21 -0.160 0.437 0.244 0.405
Mexico/18 -0.708 0.244 -0.658 0.259
Peru/16 -1.304 0.105* -0.294 0.386
United Kingdom/14 -0.821 0.213 1.310 0.106*
CPI inflation
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/17 -0.706 0.245 0.465 0.324
Colombia/17 -0.253 0.402 -0.381 0.354
Mexico/19 -0.297 0.385 -1.642 0.058
Peru/15 -0.177 0.431 0.198 0.423
United Kingdom/14 0.187 0.427 -0.968 0.175
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 0.799 0.218 -0.668 0.257
Colombia/21 -0.226 0.412 -0.292 0.387
Mexico/18 1.002 0.165 1.950 0.033
Peru/16 0.703 0.246 -0.124 0.452
United Kingdom/14 -0.744 0.235 0.200 0.422
Medium-term sample (h > 12)
GDP growth
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/12 0.867 0.202 0.965 0.177
Colombia/15 0.264 0.398 1.119 0.140
Mexico/22 -0.621 0.270 0.182 0.429
Peru/13 0.308 0.381 0.637 0.268
United Kingdom/15 0.155 0.439 -0.285 0.390
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 -0.196 0.424 0.493 0.315
Colombia/23 -0.520 0.304 -1.669 0.054
Mexico/17 -0.505 0.310 -0.203 0.421
Peru/17 -0.083 0.467 -0.472 0.322
United Kingdom/23 0.020 0.492 0.442 0.331
CPI inflation
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/12 0.730 0.240 0.932 0.185
Colombia/15 -0.252 0.402 0.193 0.425
Mexico/22 0.228 0.411 0.026 0.490
Peru/13 -2.223 0.022 -1.785 0.049
United Kingdom/15 -0.750 0.232 -1.109 0.142
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 0.797 0.219 -0.452 0.329
Colombia/23 -0.370 0.357 0.365 0.359
Mexico/17 0.475 0.320 1.281 0.109*
Peru/17 1.072 0.149 0.444 0.331
United Kingdom/23 0.750 0.230 0.348 0.365
* Weak evidence.
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ANNEX F: Tests with distance between forecasts’ median and country-IR
forecasts (pi & g)
Table F.1. Ha tests with distance (full sample 2)
Current vs. Previous Next vs. Previous
({s = 2|s = 1}) ({s = 3|s = 1})
Variable Country d.f. Tcal p1 Tcal p2
(p− value) (p− value)
Short-term sample (h ≤ 12)
GDP growth
Chile 34 -1.024 0.157 -0.908 0.185
Colombia 38 -0.247 0.403 0.094 0.463
Mexico 38 0.987 0.165 0.934 0.178
Peru 32 -0.044 0.483 0.073 0.471
United Kingdom 29 0.793 0.217 -0.999 0.163
CPI inflation
Chile 34 -1.954 0.029 -1.830 0.038
Colombia 39 -2.358 0.012 -1.480 0.073
Mexico 38 -0.388 0.350 -0.380 0.353
Peru 32 -0.036 0.486 -1.599 0.060
United Kingdom 29 -0.954 0.174 -1.142 0.131
Medium-term sample (h > 12)
GDP growth
Chile  0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Colombia 11 -1.517 0.079 -1.549 0.075
Mexico 18 -0.974 0.171 -0.993 0.167
Peru 25 0.517 0.305 -0.336 0.370
United Kingdom 39 0.340 0.368 -0.138 0.446
CPI inflation
Chile 23 -0.620 0.271 -1.257 0.111*
Colombia 37 0.221 0.413 0.474 0.319
Mexico 27 -0.495 0.312 -1.646 0.056
Peru 25 -1.095 0.142 -0.892 0.191
United Kingdom 39 -1.155 0.127* -0.742 0.231
 Since the distance is calculated with respect to the official forecast (instead of the long-term inflation
target) and the Chilean central bank’s publications have not provided enough official forecasts for the
next year’s real growth during the period 2004-2014, the tests have not enough degrees of freedom to
be calculated. * Weak evidence.
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Table F.2. Hb tests with distance (separated samples 6)
Current vs. Previous Next vs. Previous
({s = 2|s = 1}) ({s = 3|s = 1})
Variable Country/d.f. Tcal p1 Tcal p2
(p− value) (p− value)
Short-term sample (h ≤ 12)
GDP growth
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/17 -0.322 0.376 -0.226 0.412
Colombia/17 -0.270 0.395 -1.055 0.153
Mexico/19 0.618 0.272 0.954 0.176
Peru/15 2.179 0.023 1.587 0.067
United Kingdom/14 1.326 0.103* -0.998 0.168
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 -0.333 0.372 -0.315 0.379
Colombia/20 -0.131 0.448 0.508 0.308
Mexico/18 0.767 0.226 0.461 0.325
Peru/16 -1.535 0.072 -0.841 0.206
United Kingdom/14 -0.146 0.443 -0.527 0.303
CPI inflation
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/17 -0.838 0.207 -1.265 0.111*
Colombia/17 -1.562 0.068 -1.332 0.100*
Mexico/19 0.559 0.291 0.271 0.395
Peru/15 0.255 0.401 -0.779 0.224
United Kingdom/14 -1.524 0.075 -1.372 0.096
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/15 -1.789 0.047 -1.442 0.085
Colombia/21 -1.754 0.047 -0.764 0.227
Mexico/18 -0.916 0.186 -0.751 0.231
Peru/16 -0.151 0.441 -1.396 0.091
United Kingdom/14 0.062 0.476 -0.361 0.362
Medium-term sample (h > 12)
GDP growth
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/0  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Colombia/6 -1.638 0.076 -2.052 0.043
Mexico/13 -1.311 0.106* -1.260 0.115*
Peru/13 0.876 0.199 0.070 0.472
United Kingdom/15 0.168 0.434 -0.143 0.444
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/0  n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Colombia/4 -0.154 0.442 0.169 0.437
Mexico/4 0.386 0.360 0.187 0.430
Peru/11 -1.091 0.149 -0.801 0.220
United Kingdom/23 0.296 0.385 -0.094 0.463
CPI inflation
High macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/9 0.352 0.367 -0.834 0.213
Colombia/13 -0.366 0.360 -0.389 0.352
Mexico/15 0.760 0.229 0.435 0.335
Peru/13 -0.096 0.462 -0.159 0.438
United Kingdom/15 -1.525 0.074 -0.556 0.293
Low macroeconomic uncertainty
Chile/13 -0.875 0.199 -1.050 0.156
Colombia/23 0.488 0.315 0.854 0.201
Mexico/11 -0.722 0.243 -1.852 0.046
Peru/11 -1.294 0.111* -1.153 0.137
United Kingdom/23 -0.253 0.401 -0.480 0.318
* Weak evidence.  Since the distance is calculated with respect to the official forecast (instead
of the long-term inflation target) and the Chilean central bank’s publications have not provided
enough official forecasts for the next year’s real growth during the period 2004-2014, the tests
have not enough degrees of freedom to be calculated.
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